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Abstract. Optimal firm size and patterns of returns to scale among the local exchange companies in
the U.S. telecommunications industry are estimated for the years: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and
1990. The independent companies display increasing returns to scale, while the Baby Bells display
constant or decreasing returns to scale. The independent companies operate at a scale smaller than
optimal size, while the Baby Bells operate at a scale greater than optimal size. Efficiencies can be
gained by industry restructuring, by allowing independents to expand their size while the Baby Bells
can be downsized to create smaller units.
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I. Introduction
Whether economies of scale exist in a particular industry is an important strategic
issue, since their existence determines minimum efficient scale size and the amount
of investment required to enter a sector. Large changes have occurred in many parts
of the telecommunications industry, with increasing overlays between sectors such
as switching and transmission. It has been suggested that parts of the industry have
become naturally competitive; returns to scale patterns might be changing so that
several competitors of similar size can coexist, making local exchange markets
competitive (Bolter, McConnaughey and Kelsey, 1990; Shepherd, 1983).
In the above context, Greenwald and Sharkey (1989), after examining the
potential competitiveness of the local exchange sector, conclude that the forces
of technology have altered the basis of competition and, thereby, the continuing
justification of local monopoly existence. However, the recent evidence available
on scale economies in the U.S. local-exchange sector is mixed. Dalton and Mann
(1988) suggest that scale economies exist, while Guldmann (1990) and Shin and
Ying (1992) suggest that breaking up the monopoly outputs of local exchange
companies may be beneficial, and competition can be increased. However, such
prognostications are based on somewhat older data; for the year 1982 (Dalton and
Mann, 1988), the year 1980 (Guldmann, 1990) and for the period 1976 to 1983
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(Shin and Ying, 1992), and there are no data presented on what might actually be
optimal firm size in the telecommunications sector.
This paper reports the results of a study which addresses key questions related
to the structural make-up of the U.S. local exchange sector: what are the patterns
of returns to scale among firms; what is the size of the optimal firm in the U.S.
local operating sector; are there differences among different groups of firms; and
have size patterns changed over time? Local exchange competition is a key issue,
because till 1996 it has represented the last frontier with regard to telecommuni-
cations deregulation, and the local loop provides the basic infrastructural element
for competition to take place in all forms in the industry. Yet, firms with loops of
different sizes do exist in this sector, and each local operating company has privi-
leges in its demarcated territory. Studying optimal size patterns of local exchange
companies is very germane, since a first-order understanding of the minimum size
of the efficient firm can be acquired.
Data envelopment is used to estimate returns to scale and the most productive
scale size for a sample of the 38 major local exchange companies in the U.S. at six
points in time: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. The paper is organized as
follows. In section two some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to scale
and size in the telecommunications industry are discussed, particularly with regard
to the local exchange sector. In section 3 the research approach is also described.
Section 4 contains an analysis and discussion of the results obtained, and section 5
has concluding remarks about the strategic implications of the results.
II. Issues of Scale in Local Exchange Telecommunications
Returns to scale estimates map the relationship between the scale of use of a rel-
evant chosen combination of productive inputs and the rate of output of a firm.
Therefore, the size of the firm is a critical variable in influencing efficiency. In a
telecommunications firm network management is the primary activity, since the
basic objective in service provision is to permit inter-connectivity. Traditionally,
returns to scale in local exchange telecommunications have been identified as aris-
ing from two main areas. The first is from economies in the physical provision
of basic services. Given the network of lines developed as part of the "Universal
Service" infra-structure, it is thought to be more efficient to have one single con-
nection to each end-use location, rather than 160 million telephones in the U.S.
connected to each other causing duplication. Hence, higher-order connectivity is
required with transmission lines connected to switches providing the network for
the exchange or communications (Sharkey, 1982). This pre-supposes that returns to
scale in switching and transmission of signals enables service to be best provided
within a local area through one or more switches, giving rise to a minimum efficient
network size (Littlechild, 1979).
Second, there can be managerial economies of size in network planning, coor-
dination and management. Key resources in a network are access lines, switches
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and employees, which are combined to form the “live” network. The primary net-
work asset is the number of access lines, which are supported by the switches and
employees (Green, 1992). A larger network owned by big operating companies
may be able to handle randomly varying demand more efficiently by reallocations
of capacity among switching and transmission equipment. Planning and managing
network resources may be cheaper, and if there are fixed costs of network man-
agement they can be spread over a greater number of lines in a larger network, as
measured by the number of access lines (Greenwald and Sharkey, 1989). Hence,
the larger the network, as measured by the number of access lines, the greater the
presumed returns to scale.
There are also size-driven managerial economies of scale due to specialization
and vertical integration, because larger firms are often technologically sophisticat-
ed. Such sophistication may lead to a more rapid diffusion of modern technologies
in these larger firms. X-inefficiencies may arise because of size, ownership and
inertia factors, or for exogenous reasons such as regulation. These x-inefficiencies
vitiate against the presumed capabilities that may accrue with large-scale, because
coordination failures can occur due to size.
Micro-level scale studies of the U.S. local-exchange sector are few, but some
do exist. Several other studies reveal the existence of scale economies in the
overall U.S. or Canadian telephone system, of which the local exchange is a
part. These are of two types: production function oriented (Vinod, 1972) or, using
duality theory (Shepard, 1970), cost-function oriented (Christensen, Cummings and
Schoeh, 1983), and each recent study of scale economies in telecommunications
of which we are aware has used the cost function approach, primarily estimating a
translog cost function. See Fuss (1983) for a review of the principal studies which
have used the translog cost function approach.
Waverman (1989) reviews most of these studies and states that “the weight of
the evidence of all these studies (as to whether scale economies exist or not in
the telecommunications sector), is simply not strong enough, since changing the
level of aggregation, the functional form, the constraints imposed, or the objective
function dramatically alters the results” (1989: 87). While extant studies may
reveal scale economies, they suffer from lacunae which may call the interpretation
of the results into question. One is an aggregation bias. The unit of analysis in all
reviewed studies has been the Bell System. Data has been pooled across local and
long-distance operations to evaluate whether the system displays scale economies.
Aggregation bias in calculating scale economies thus exists, if AT&T is treated
as the firm, and “aggregate data are just too large a production unit for the analysis”
(Waverman, 1989:89). Waverman also writes: “My view is that the subadditivity
test for aggregate AT&T is so sensitive to data and to econometric technique that
it cannot be relied on for making policy” (1989, p. 90). The concept of scale
economies is a firm-level concept; and, at that level of analysis what is involved is
the calculation of the effect or costs across different sizes of exchange of adding
one subscriber or unit of output. The unit of analysis should, therefore, be the firm,
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which is a local operating company, or a long-distance services operator; also data
should be generated as to what is optimal firm size. While the evidence presented in
the studies noted include local exchange companies, the studies have measured the
global effect across all AT&T companies, which includes the AT&T Long Lines
operations as well as twenty-two Baby Bells, of increasing output in one operating
unit somewhere. Such aggregation affects the meaningful drawing of conclusions
with regard to the local-exchange sector.
Also, none of the studies Waverman (1989) reviews have looked at scale
economies possessed by the independent operating companies. These companies
make up a substantial portion of the U.S. telecommunications industry. Leaving
them out of studies seriously distorts any conclusions generalized to the U.S. local-
exchange sector as a whole. Dalton and Mann (1988) and Guldmann (1990) are
the only two studies of which we are aware that specifically consider other local
exchange firms in their sample.
III. Empirical Approach
There are over 1500 telephone operating companies in the U.S. Of these about 50
are Class 1 carriers who report to the Federal Communications Commission and
have annual revenues of over $100 million; they account for about 80 percent of
local operating company customers. The rest are primarily small rural telephone
companies funded by the Rural Electrification Administration; their operations are
not comparable to that of the big companies. Guldmann (1990) studied these rural
companies. However, all other studies include the Class 1 companies, which this
study does as well. The returns to scale estimates of 38 local exchange telephone
companies, out of the top 50 (these companies account for about 95 percent of
local exchange revenues), are computed for 6 time-periods: 1975, 1978, 1981,
1984, 1987 and 1990 are compared.
Data from the annual FCC documentStatistics of Communications Common
Carriersare used for empirical analysis. The companies studied include 21 of the
22 Bell operating companies, 6 United Telecommunications’ local exchange com-
panies, 5 GTE local exchange companies, 3 CONTEL companies, 2 independents
– Cincinnati Bell and Southern New England Telephone – and 1 company – Central
Telephone – from the CENTEL group. Other companies are left out because of
various bits of missing data; the companies left out are the smaller operating com-
panies within the non-Bell category, the main one of which is Rochester Telephone
Company. In the data coverage, it is ensured that there is a 38 firm panel for each
of the 6 years analyzed, covering all the important operating companies. A list of
companies is available on request.
The year 1975 represents a period of full regulation. By 1978 technology in the
form of electronic switching had started diffusing in visible quantities. In that year
certain competition-enhancing decisions were also made, particularly with regard
to the pricing decisions of firms. 1981 represents a time period when there was yet
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regulation of the industry, but key decisions to restructure the industry were taken
by the Reagan administration and the Anti-trust Division of the Justice Department.
In 1984 the Bell operating companies were formally divested to the seven regional
holding companies (RHCs). By 1987 the industry was competitive in some sub-
sectors, including many in which the local operating companies participated. By
1990 the cumulative impact of the policy changes that had occurred in the industry
would have been felt on the operations and behavior of the firms.
The tabulated results that follow in section 4 are calculated by estimating for
each time-period (1975, 1978, 1981, 1987 and 1990) DEA returns to scale and
most productive scale size estimates for all 38 companies in the sample. Baby Bell
and non-Bell operating companies results are compared as two separate groups
in the discussion of results. While the non-Bell companies have not been in the
limelight relative to the Bell companies, they are often large (GTE California
has annual revenues of over $2 billion), operate in critical states (Southern New
England Telephone in population-rich Connecticut) or cities (Cincinnati Bell in
Cincinnati), and in many local exchanges have almost as large a market share as
the Bell operating companies. For example, in Ohio the share of Ohio Bell in total
telecommunications operations of the state is only marginally above those of other
companies.
For 1984, 1987 and 1990 the results for the operating companies belonging to
the 7 post-1984 RHCs are consolidated and presented as if they were Baby Bells all
displaying similarities in behavior, and compared against the results of the non-Bell
companies. The rationale is that the BOC/RHC operating companies were subject
to stricter control and regulation in the pre-divestiture era, and as such would also
have been more susceptible to the 1984 “shock”. Additionally, they generally are
of larger size for historical reasons (Brock, 1981), compared to the other operating
companies; they have also undergone major cultural transformation in the decade
of the 1980s (Schlesinger, Dyer, Clough and Landau, 1987).
For the years 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990 the Baby Bell operating
companies represent an interesting grouping for comparison vis-à- i the non-
Bell operating companies. For instance, the non-Bell independents were more
aggressive prior to 1984 in updating their electronic switching capabilities, as
shown by Zanfei (1992). In the post-1984 era the Bell operating companies have
become equally aggressive and competitive, not least because of “equal access”
pressures (Bolter, McConnaughey and Kelsey, 1990), but till 1989 had not caught
up in technological sophistication with the non-Bell Companies.
DEA is a linear programming model introduced in Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes
(1978) to evaluate the relative efficiency of decision making units that use multiple
inputs to produce multiple outputs. It is a technique which explicitly allows the
computation of returns to scale estimates for each firm, where the firm is the unit
of analysis. In other words, the aggregation problem which has plagued all prior
studies of the telecommunications industry is avoided. Details of how firm-specific
returns to scale parameter and most productive or optimal scale size for each input
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Table I. Returns to scale characteristics of the firm studied
Years
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990
Constant Returns to Scale
All Companies 6 7 9 16 9 11
Bell Companies 3 3 4 12 6 8
Non-Bell Companies 3 4 5 4 3 3
Increasing Returns to Scale
All Companies 14 17 14 15 19 15
Bell Companies 1 5 5 3 5 3
Non-Bell Companies 13 12 9 12 14 12
Decreasing Returns to Scale
All Companies 18 14 15 7 10 12
Bell Companies 17 13 12 6 10 10
Non-Bell Companies 1 1 3 1 0 2
Grand Total
All Companies 38 38 38 38 38 38
Bell Companies 21 21 21 21 21 21
Non-Bell Companies 17 17 17 17 17 17
consumed or output generated are computed can be found in Banker (1984) and
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). This paper is a straightforward application
of the original Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) formulation. Therefore, details
are not provided. There is now a very large literature on DEA. This is evaluated
by Seiford (1996). Seiford (1996) and Seiford and Thrall (1990) provide details
of the various advances made within the DEA framework. Interested readers can
follow-up the literature using the pieces suggested.
IV. Discussion of Results
The patterns of individual returns to scale characteristics shown by the two groups of
companies as well as all the companies in the sample taken together are discussed.
Table I below highlights the number of companies which enjoy constant, increasing
or decreasing returns to scale, and the changes in the patterns over the 6-year period
analyzed.
The data in Table I reveal, first, that over time a greater number of companies
display constant returns to scale: from 6 companies for 1975, the number increases
to 9 for 1981. For 1984 there are 16 companies in this category; however, it is
a year of transition, and it is more appropriate to review results for 1987 and
1990, where there are 9 and 11 firms displaying constant returns. Hence, by 1990
at least 29 percent of the companies are at an optimum size, where they have
exhausted increasing returns, but do not yet start displaying decreasing returns, or
diseconomies of scale.
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The trend with regard to increasing returns is stable over time, relatively speak-
ing. Firms displaying increasing returns to scale are by far the largest category:
between 37 and 50 percent of the sample firms display such returns. For 1975
14 companies displayed increasing returns; for 1990 the number is 15, or 39 per-
cent of the total number of companies. These numbers are important because they
highlight that a significant proportion of firms can still have the ability to exploit
further economies of scale, because the optimum size of operations have yet to be
attained. However, the evidence with regards to decreasing returns to scale also
bears scrutiny.
From Table I it is noted that for 1975 there are 18 companies, or 47 percent,
displaying decreasing returns to scale. In other words, given their production corre-
spondences, they are too big and have exhausted scale economies. For 1975 this is,
by far, the characteristic most significant. For 1990 the number of companies in the
decreasing returns category is 12, or 32 percent of the sample. This improvement
in the abilities to reap scale economies has resulted in a rise in the number of com-
panies displaying constant returns to scale. Over time we find that the structural
changes taking place in the industry have brought about a realignment in company
size, as more companies have moved from a situation of suffering from disec-
onomies of scale to one where they neither suffer from it, nor are they enjoying
scale economies.
The number of Baby Bell companies in the constant returns to scale category
has more than doubled from 1975, when there are 3 in that category, to 8 by 1990.
Conversely, the number of non-Bell companies displaying constant returns to scale
has stayed static over time. Of the companies enjoying increasing returns to scale
the number of Bell companies is smaller than that of the non-Bells. Compared
to the non-Bells, in each year there are only a handful of Bell companies – 1 in
1975, 5 in 1981, 3 in 1990 – enjoying increasing returns. Conversely, in 1975, 13
non-Bell companies (or 93 percent of companies in that category for that year)
display increasing returns. In 1990 the trend is only slightly different; 12 non-Bell
companies (or 80 percent of companies in that category for that year) display
increasing returns to scale.
The implications of the above results are that constant returns or decreasing
returns to scale do not characterize the structure of the local exchange sector;
rather, firms are smaller than their optimal size. Increasing returns to scale prevail.
Yet, such returns prevail among the smaller, non-Bell companies which have yet
to exploit all possible economies of scale. While Bell companies have not reaped
the benefits of size in exploiting scale economies, as shown by the low number of
Bell companies in the increasing returns to scale category, the divergence between
optimal and actual size has reduced over time.
Recollect that some Bell operating companies are very substantial in size, each
often considerably larger than the telephone operations of many small and wealthy,
or even large and not-so-wealthy, nations. For example, Pacific Bell has operations
throughout California while Southwestern Bell operates in Texas, Oklahoma, Mis-
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Table II. Details of most productive scale size: Number of access lines (in 000s)
Actual Number of Lines Optimal Number of Lines
All Baby Non-baby All Baby Non-baby
Year companies bells bells companies bells bells
1975 3631.76 5670.95 1112.76 2104.81 2194.43 1944.10
1978 4085.47 6343.67 1295.94 2815.04 3094.79 2469.47
1981 4377.21 6772.90 1417.82 3212.27 3526.21 2824.46
1984 2766.74 4270.71 908.88 2944.06 3781.60 1910.65
1987 3033.03 4668.14 1013.18 3738.19 4010.49 3401.82
1990 3326.61 5123.19 1107.27 3298.01 3059.75 3592.32
souri, Kansas and Arizona. Among the 18 companies for 1975 which displayed
decreasing returns to scale in 1975, 17 were Bell companies. For 1987 all com-
panies to do so were Bell companies, and for 1990 10 of the 12 (or 89 percent)
companies to do so were Bell companies. The implication is that Bell companies
are still too big. They have transcended the scale of operations where they can
exploit increasing returns, and they suffer from diseconomies of scale. Over time,
however, the number of companies doing so has, nevertheless, dropped; from 17
Bell companies showing decreasing returns to scale in 1975 (or 81 percent of the
Bell companies in our sample), the number in 1990 is 10 (or 48 percent of the
total sample of Bell companies that we study); this further confirms the fact that
transformation in activities characterizes Bell Companies in the post-divestiture
period.
For each combination of inputs, given the firms in the sample, an optimal
size for each input can be derived. Firms displaying increasing returns to scale are
operating at less than their optimal size; firms displaying decreasing returns to scale
are operating at a level greater than their optimal size. The number of access lines
is the primary way to measure network size. Network management is a key critical
capability which telephone operating companies use to deliver their products, and
the network in place permits inter-connectivity between customers. Historically, the
AT&T strategy was to have large operating company networks on the grounds that
these large companies would exploit economies of scale in network management
and provide the universal service needed. Details of the MPSS for access lines are
given in Table II.
The data in Table II are expressed in thousands of lines; however, results are
discussed taking millions of lines as the unit of analysis. The average optimal size
for access lines for all the companies in the sample rises from 2.1 million in 1975
to 3.2 million in 1981; it rises somewhat more, to 3.7 million, in 1987, but drops to
3.3 million in 1990. An optimal network size is 3.3 million lines; this number of
lines yields neither economies nor diseconomies of scale in network management.
Until 1981 firms operated with diseconomies of scale in access lines. The actual
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Table III. Trends in percentage of customer access lines digitized
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
All groups average 8.98 12.88 20.09 28.60 37.17 43.61 53.69
Baby bells average 0.51 2.16 7.67 14.94 22.80 29.00 36.76
Non-bells average 20.84 27.90 37.50 47.72 57.28 64.06 70.62
Source: Computed from Zanfei (1992: 236–237).
numbers were: 3.6 million for 1975; 4.1 million for 1978; and 4.4 million for 1981;
these exceeded the optimal size, as Table II shows. Since 1984 there has been a
movement towards optimality in possessing the scale efficient number of lines, and
by 1990 both optimal and actual number of lines are 3.3 million.
The average optimal size for the Bell companies ranges between 2.2 million in
1975 and 4 million in 1987, rising consistently until then. But it drops to 3 million
in 1990. The Bell companies have been operating at above their optimal size in all
the years studied, as the data reveal. In 1975 the excess lines (actual lines minus
the MPSS lines) were 3.5 million, but by 1990 the excess was down to 1.8 million.
The non-Bell companies’ average optimal size is lower than that of all companies
taken together as a whole or of the Baby Bell companies for the years 1975 to
1987; it is higher than that of either, at 3.5 million lines, for 1990. The evidence
suggests that these smaller companies still enjoy considerable scope in exploiting
economies of scale in network operations. At the same time, their actual number
of lines is always considerably less than optimal size for all years. There is a gap
of 2.4 million lines for 1990; thus, non-Bell companies, which currently enjoy
increasing returns to scale, can increase their network size by that number of lines
before scale economies in network management disappear.
One key factor influencing optimum network utilization is the type of technology
being used by telephone companies to energize the network. Modern switching
developments have slashed the costs of network intelligence by enabling local
exchange companies to move away from using transmission systems, the costs of
building which are still at expensive levels of the part, unlike the costs of switching
which have dropped significantly. For example, Flamm (1989) documents how the
telephone plant induces for inside plant, central-office equipment and electronic
switching systems rise and then fall, very rapidly indeed for electronic switching
systems from the early 1980s to the mid 1980s. As a result of these developments,
it is more economical to move the network nodes out towards the end-user and
substitute switching equipment for transmission equipment. Such transfers lessen
capital costs of the total network. Because of digitization, the ability of modern
switching centers to handle greater volumes also rises, and adopters of modern
technology will find themselves gaining increasing returns to scale (Huber, 1989).
Data in Table III are relevant for the analysis.
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The data are derived from Zanfei (1992). They show what percentages of cus-
tomer access lines have been converted to digital technology, for seven years in the
1980s. The data are not coterminous with the data used for the present study; these
data are commented on only for the purposes of displaying trends. For local oper-
ating companies as a whole, the percentage of digitalized lines goes from less than
10 percent in 1983 to over half the lines by 1989. However, the average percentages
for the Baby Bells are less than one percent in 1983, rising to 37 percent in 1989.
Conversely, the non-Bells have been very aggressive in technology upgradation. In
1983, 21 percent of lines were digitalized; by 1989 the percentage had risen to over
70, and for some individual company groupings where even higher. For example,
the CENTEL and CONTEL Companies’ access lines were ninety three percent and
eighty percent digitalized respectively.
While the data on line digitalization are not reliable or compatible for the purpose
of drawing strong inferences, those firms adopting greater quantities of digital
technology do seem to benefit from increasing returns to scale. Non-Bell companies
have adopted a greater number of digitalized access lines in the 1980s; as they have
adopted these in greater quantity, more companies within that category start to
enjoy increasing returns. For 1981 nine of these companies were in the increasing
returns category. By 1987 this number had increased to 14. Concomitantly there
has been an impact on optimal size, which has also increased. These results provide
some evidence about the impact technological change in the industry might have on
efficiency characteristics; nevertheless, it is reiterated that the impact of technical
factors relative to managerial or other factors has not been separated out in this
paper and the evidence is merely expository.
V. Conclusions and Implications
This paper examines whether the principal companies making up the local exchange
sectors of the U.S. telecommunications industry display increasing, decreasing or
constant returns to scale, whether the patterns of most efficient scale for resource
inputs as displayed are changing over time, and whether different groups that make
up the sector, the Bell and non-Bell companies, display differences in such patterns.
This study specifically looks at the companies in the sector in a disaggregated
manner; a contemporary period between 1975 to 1990 is covered in six time-slices:
1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. During these time-periods a major natural
experiment in industrial organization took place in the U.S. telecommunications
industry. Major recent issues in policy-making devolve around whether local-
exchange markets are competitive, whether local monopolies that exist should
exist, and whether the evolving structure of the sector is such that more firms can
be accommodated within it.
The returns to scale estimates and estimates of minimum efficient or optimal
scale were computed using a non-parametric frontier production technique – data
envelopment analysis. The results, that increasing returns to scale seem to be not
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absent, are broadly consistent with prior empirical work on scale economies in
the telecommunications industry. The emerging evidence (Guldmann, 1990; Shin
and Ying, 1992) suggests that the local exchange sector is not a natural monopoly.
What the results in this paper instead highlight is a possible optimal structure for
the sector. It is found that though increasing returns to scale prevail, the larger
Bell companies do not enjoy them. Rather, Bell companies display either constant
or decreasing returns to scale. Conversely, the non-Bell companies are currently
at a scale of operations where they enjoy increasing returns to scale and can
considerably enlarge their activities before diseconomies set in.
The results have the following policy implications. The production structure
of the local exchange is such that several competitors of similar size can coexist,
and the issue of what is the size of an appropriate local exchange monopoly is
called into question. The Bell companies, which make up the largest component
(in revenue terms) of the local exchange sector, include some very large, multi-state
firms. Even among single-state operators (for example, Pacific Bell and New York
Telephone among others) there are Baby Bell firms whose size puts them within
the top 200 corporations in the United States. While these companies have been
shown to be more technically efficient than the non-Bell companies (Majumdar,
1994), they are also very much bigger and do not enjoy scale efficiencies. Over
the last eight years, since divestiture, some of the Bell operating companies have
downsized rapidly. Yet, some of them can be broken up further.
The results indicate that efficiencies might be gained by restructuring the U.S.
local exchange sector, since the institutionally determined operational boundaries of
the dominant firms are smaller than their actual boundaries. Conversely, permitting
non-dominant non-Bell companies to enter new territories might enable these
companies to exploit the increasing returns to scale their production structure
permits, before these economies too are exhausted. If some of these companies do
not possess the necessarycapabilities to enter new territories, opening up the market
to other new entrants such as foreign firms or the long-distance operators which
possess the requisite resources can ensure that production efficiencies available are
enjoyed to the fullest.
Investment in switches by firms represents assets to provide services with;
conversely, infrastructural assets can also be created by new entrants with new
switches, given that optimal size is around 3 million lines and switching costs
are dropping rapidly (Flamm, 1989). With network optimal size being at these
levels, the changes in switching technology imply that a larger number of firms,
which are of intermediate size and using fungible and modular switches, can create
second tier networks in the local exchange sector. As long as interconnections
among networks are made available, at appropriate prices, the implication of such
a structural pattern is that several local-exchange service suppliers can enter the
sector and competition among them will enhance welfare.
Traditionally, Baby Bells have been thought to be superior in efficiency patterns.
Yet, they are burdened by history in that they operate in territories which are
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geographically diverse and large. However, given the evidence of a decline in
their optimal size for access lines, the Bell companies might be able to divest
some operations so as to concentrate on what might be their economically efficient
core; conversely, they could create separate stand-alone operating companies, each
operating in specific areas at a scale closer to the optimum size. Additionally,
allowing local-exchange market entry by other firms which are of the requisite size
can permit side-by-side competition, and this option may provide an efficient mode
of production organization in the larger markets presently served by the Baby Bells.
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